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II.-302 
CONCERNING BEHAVIOR: DO A PUBLIC 
EMPLOYEE’S FREE ASSOCIATION CLAIMS 
SHARE THE PUBLIC CONCERN 
REQUIREMENT OF FREE SPEECH CLAIMS? 
Abstract: On September 28, 2018, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held, in 
Palardy v. Township of Millburn, that it would not apply the public concern test 
from Connick v. Myers to public employees’ First Amendment free association 
claims. The Circuits are split on whether to apply the public concern test: the 
Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits apply the test; the Fifth and Eleventh 
Circuits do not apply it; and the Ninth and Tenth Circuits take hybrid approaches. 
This comment argues that the Third Circuit mischaracterized its holding, and its 
approach resembles the hybrid approach of the Tenth Circuit more than the Fifth 
Circuit it claimed to follow. This comment further argues that, although the Third 
Circuit’s approach is an improvement on the circuit courts that apply the public 
concern test, a better approach would have the court adopt a strict scrutiny ap-
proach to resolving free association claims by public employees. 
INTRODUCTION 
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as incorporated 
against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, protects freedom of associa-
tion as well as freedom of speech.1 When a state entity violates a person’s con-
stitutional rights, that person may seek redress through an action filed under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983.2 
These protections extend to public employees, who can sue their employ-
er (the state) under § 1983 for disciplinary actions in the workplace that violate 
the employee’s rights.3 In 1983, in Connick v. Myers, the Supreme Court held 
                                                                                                                           
 1 See NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (holding that the liberty 
interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment included the liberty to 
associate with others to advance a particular belief). The Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth 
Amendment extended First Amendment protections to actions taken by state governments, not just the 
federal government. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (holding that First Amend-
ment prohibition on laws respecting establishment of religion applied to New Jersey’s use of state 
funds to support religious schools). The First Amendment protects citizens’ right to speak without 
government interference (free speech), but it also protects their right to associate with others (free 
association). Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460. 
 2 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2018) (providing a cause of action for any person deprived of a constitutional 
right by a person acting on behalf of a state or territory). 
 3 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983). A public employee is any person employed in 
order to manage the affairs of government. Public Employee, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 
2019). 
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that a public employer could not impose conditions on its employees that in-
fringed on those employees’ First Amendment rights.4 Under the test applied in 
Connick, an employee’s speech will only be protected if it is on a matter of 
public concern relating to matters that might concern the community.5 In de-
termining whether a given action infringes on the employee’s free speech 
rights, a court must balance the employee’s interest in discussing matters of 
public concern with the employer’s interest in running an efficient office to 
provide public services.6 
After Connick, the Supreme Court added another step in the test courts 
apply to public employee free speech claims.7 Whether an instance of employ-
ee speech deals with a matter of public concern is a contextual and fact-
sensitive inquiry that must be resolved before the claim can proceed.8 In 2006, 
in Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Supreme Court held that a public employee only 
has a freedom of speech claim if the employee spoke in their capacity as a pri-
vate citizen.9 Therefore, speech produced by that employee in the course of 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Connick, 461 U.S. at 147. In Connick, an assistant U.S. Attorney’s (AUSA) supervisor trans-
ferred her to a different section of the court. Id. at 140. Unhappy with her transfer, she created a ques-
tionnaire for other AUSAs to give their opinion on the transfer policy, general morale within the of-
fice, the possibility of forming a committee to address grievances, and potential pressure within the 
department for AUSAs to engage in political work. Id. at 140–41. After she distributed her question-
naire, her supervisor fired her, purportedly for refusing to accept the transfer. Id. at 141. Her supervi-
sor also characterized her production and distribution of the questionnaire as an act of insubordination. 
Id. The Supreme Court upheld her firing. Id. at 154. 
 5 Id. at 146. The Court distinguished a public concern from a private complaint between employ-
ee and employer. Id. at 154. Although the Court held the political pressure question on her question-
naire did deal with a matter of public concern, the Court ultimately determined that her firing did not 
deprive her of her First Amendment right to freely express herself because of the disruption she 
caused within the office. Id. at 149, 154. 
 6 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). The Court has not rigorously defined the 
limits of public concern, but the Court has suggested that it could be a contextual determination, based 
on the form and content of any given speech. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147–48 (holding that the ques-
tion of whether a given instance of speech “addresses a matter of public concern” should be deter-
mined contextually). Courts have focused their inquiry on the content of the speech. See, e.g., Ellins v. 
City of Sierra Madre, 710 F.3d 1049, 1058 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding that speech made in connection 
with a no-confidence vote in a police chief by union members was on a matter of public concern); 
Kristofek v. Vill. of Orland Hills, 712 F.3d 979, 985 (7th Cir. 2013) (stating that a police officer’s 
speech about the wrongfulness of releasing a criminal due to political connections was a matter of 
public concern because of its content); Rodgers v. Banks, 344 F.3d 587, 600–01 (6th Cir. 2003) (hold-
ing that a memo criticizing a mental hospital’s infringement on patient privacy spoke on a matter of 
public concern); Hellstrom v. U.S. Dep’t of Veterans’ Affairs, 46 F. App’x 651, 656 (2d Cir. 2002) 
(holding that a demoted manager’s criticisms of his former director were employee grievances and not 
a matter of public concern). 
 7 See infra notes 9–11 and accompanying text (discussing the creation of a private citizen re-
quirement for public employee free speech claims). 
 8 Marni M. Zack, Note, Public Employee Free Speech: The Policy Reasons for Rejecting a Per Se 
Rule Precluding Speech Rights, 46 B.C. L. REV. 893, 897–98 (2005). 
 9 547 U.S. 410, 421–22 (2006). 
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their job duties does not receive First Amendment protection.10 Currently, pub-
lic employee free speech claims must satisfy both the public concern require-
ment from Connick and the private citizen requirement from Garcetti in order 
to proceed.11 The circuits have split, however, on whether the public concern 
and private citizen requirements should also be applied to public employee free 
association claims.12 
The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits apply the public concern 
requirement to public employee association claims.13 The Fifth and Eleventh do 
not.14 In a case of first impression, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals held in 
2018, in Palardy v. Township of Millburn, that the public concern and private 
citizen requirements do not apply to a police officer’s free association claim for 
discrimination based on union membership.15 The court held that some union 
memberships might be a matter of public concern, but there existed no justicia-
ble basis for determining which ones.16 The court also noted that Garcetti explic-
itly described the private citizen requirement as applying only to speech 
claims.17 Finally, the court held that union membership was not an official duty 
of an employee and therefore satisfied the private citizen requirement.18 
Part I of this Comment describes the current state of the law regarding em-
ployee free association claims and the history of Palardy.19 Part II examines and 
discusses the various approaches courts have taken to applying a public concern 
                                                                                                                           
 10 Id. The Court did not provide a universal rule for determining when an employee spoke in their 
private capacity, but the Court differentiated such private capacity speech from speech made as part of 
an employee’s professional responsibilities. See id. (holding that plaintiff’s speech could be restricted 
when that speech took the form of a memo prepared in his official capacity as a deputy, not as a pri-
vate citizen). 
 11 Palardy v. Twp. of Millburn, 906 F.3d 76, 81 (3d Cir. 2018). 
 12 Id. at 82. 
 13 See Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 107 (2d Cir. 2004) (requiring plaintiffs to demonstrate that 
their association with a union was a “matter of public concern” before considering their constitutional 
free association claim); Edwards v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 249–50 (4th Cir. 1999) (apply-
ing the public concern test to a suspended police officer’s free association claim); Griffin v. Thomas, 
929 F.2d 1210, 1212–13 (7th Cir. 1991) (applying the public concern test to a free association claim); 
Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 692 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that Connick’s public concern requirement 
applies equally to speech and association claims). 
 14 See Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1158 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that a public employee 
dismissed for his political affiliation does not need to meet the public concern requirement governing 
free speech claims); Hatcher v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. & Orphanage, 809 F.2d 1546, 1558 (11th Cir. 1987) 
(noting that the public concern requirement, as applied to free association claims, would overturn 
precedent and damage first amendment rights). 
 15 906 F.3d at 82–83. A free association claim arises when an employee argues that they have been 
discriminated against or otherwise interfered with in a manner that restricts their right to associate with 
peers. See Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460 (holding that freedom to associate to advance a belief is protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process clause and its protection of freedom of speech). 
 16 Palardy, 906 F.3d at 82–83. 
 17 Id. at 83. 
 18 Id. at 83–84. 
 19 See infra notes 23–75 and accompanying text. 
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test to public employee free association claims.20 Finally, Part III argues that the 
Third Circuit’s approach, although reasonable, mischaracterizes the Fifth Cir-
cuit’s precedent.21 It presents an alternative approach for resolving the public 
concern and private citizen questions when dealing with free association claims.22 
I. THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEE FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND 
THE BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF PALARDY 
Over the course of the twentieth century, a series of decisions shaped the 
rights of public employees to speak and associate freely without facing retalia-
tion from their employers.23 Palardy is the latest decision in this series deline-
ating the circumstances under which a public employee can be disciplined for 
his associations.24 This Part discusses the legal standards governing the Third 
Circuit’s decision in Palardy and the history of the case itself.25 Section A be-
gins with a description of the case law regarding public employee free associa-
tion claims.26 Section B then briefly describes the history of Palardy, from the 
events preceding filing to the Third Circuit’s 2018 decision.27 
A. History of Public Employee First Amendment Rights 
For much of U.S. history, public employees had no grounds to challenge 
any conditions of their employment, even conditions that abridged a constitu-
tional right.28 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes established the doctrine that pub-
lic employees could not challenge conditions of their employment on constitu-
tional grounds, writing that “[a] policeman may have a constitutional right to 
talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.”29 In other 
                                                                                                                           
 20 See infra notes 76–107 and accompanying text. 
 21 See infra notes 108–134 and accompanying text. 
 22 See infra notes 135–155 and accompanying text. 
 23 Compare Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (allowing a state school system to 
restrict the free speech and association rights of its employees), with Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568 (pre-
venting a state school system from attaching conditions to employment that unreasonably restricted 
employee free speech rights). 
 24 Palardy, 906 F.3d at 84. 
 25 See infra notes 28–75 and accompanying text. 
 26 See infra notes 28–46 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 47–75 and accompanying text. 
 28 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 143–44 (reviewing past cases dismissing constitutional claims in 
similar circumstances); see also Adler, 342 U.S. at 492 (holding that employees of a state school sys-
tem must follow terms of employment dictated by the state, even if they are restrictive of their free 
speech and association rights); Garner v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 720–21 (1951) (holding 
that a city can discharge employees for political affiliation). 
 29 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892). Justice Holmes wrote in 
his opinion that a city may require adherence to its rules as a condition of employment. Id. Although a 
rule against discussing politics may require a public employee to give up some free speech rights, that 
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words, public employees may have to accept restrictions on their constitutional 
rights or lose their jobs.30 In the 1950s and 60s, however, a series of cases chal-
lenged Justice Holmes’s doctrine.31 In 1968, in Pickering v. Board of Educa-
tion, the Supreme Court held that an employer could not offer employment 
with an unreasonable condition attached.32 Following Pickering, the Court held 
in 1983, in Connick, that the First Amendment protects speech that is “on a 
matter of public concern.”33 To determine whether speech addresses a matter 
of public concern, a court must consider the totality of the speech, including its 
content and the circumstances of its delivery.34 Courts consider the following 
factors to determine whether speech addresses a public concern: the space and 
time in which the employee spoke, the employee’s motive in delivering the 
speech, the effect of the speech on the employee’s relationships with peers and 
the employee’s ability to do their own job, and the employee’s employment 
responsibilities.35 A court must balance a citizen’s free speech interests with 
the state’s interests in running effective public services.36 This balancing test, 
emerging from the Pickering case, is known as the Pickering test.37 
                                                                                                                           
did not pose a constitutional question because the Constitution did not guarantee public employment 
to anyone who wished for it. Id. at 517–18. 
 30 See id. at 517–18 (holding that nothing prevents a mayor from conditioning a policeman’s 
employment on adherence to a rule restricting speech). 
 31 See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952) (holding that a state statute violated 
the right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment because it required public universi-
ty employees to take a loyalty oath as a condition of employment). The Court held in Wieman that, 
although there is no general right to public employment, a public servant has constitutional protections 
was against being fired based on arbitrary or discriminatory grounds. Id. 
 32 391 U.S. at 568. Marvin Pickering, a teacher employed by the defendants’ school district, 
wrote a letter to the editor of a local newspaper that was critical of the school district’s attempts to 
increase revenue by raising taxes. Id. at 564. The school board fired Mr. Pickering after determining 
that his letter was disruptive to the district’s schools. Id. The Court held that Mr. Pickering could not 
be fired because of his speech because he had the right to speak on important public issues. Id. at 574. 
 33 461 U.S. at 147. 
 34 Id. at 147–48. The Court in Connick noted that whether a given instance of speech addressed a 
public concern is a legal, not a factual, question. Id. at 148 n.7. That meant that the Court had the 
responsibility to consider the content of the speech in question and determine for itself whether that 
speech addressed a public concern. Id. at 150 n.10. In Rankin v. McPherson, Ardith McPherson, an 
employee of a county constable’s office, opined in a conversation that she hoped then-President 
Ronald Reagan would be assassinated. 483 U.S. 378, 381 (1987). When her supervisor heard about 
this speech, he terminated her employment. Id. at 381–82. The Supreme Court held that, as a state-
ment about an ongoing news story commanding heavy publicity, McPherson’s speech addressed a 
matter of public concern. See id. at 386. 
 35 See Rodric B. Schoen, Pickering Plus Thirty Years: Public Employees and Free Speech, 30 
TEX. TECH. L. REV. 5, 30 (1999) (describing factors considered by courts in evaluating whether em-
ployee speech addresses a matter of public concern). 
 36 Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. 
 37 Id.; see, e.g., Commc’n Workers of Am. v. Ector Cty. Hosp. Dist., 467 F.3d 427, 431 (5th Cir. 
2006) (applying the Pickering test to a ban on pro-union buttons worn by public employees); Baldas-
sare v. New Jersey, 250 F.3d 188, 201 (3d Cir. 2001) (analyzing a law enforcement investigator’s 
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Subsequent developments added further requirements to public employee 
free speech claims.38 In 2006, in Garcetti, the Supreme Court held that state-
ments made pursuant to the employee’s official duties, rather than as a private 
citizen, were not protected under Connick.39 The Court’s holding limited free 
speech protections for public employees to circumstances when they are 
speaking as private citizens, rather than in their official capacities.40 Thus, to 
prevail on a free speech violation claim, a public employee must establish that 
they were speaking on a matter of public concern and that they spoke as a pri-
vate citizen.41 
The public concern and private citizen requirements have been applied 
inconsistently across circuits to public employee claims based on free associa-
tion rights.42 The Second, Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits apply the public 
                                                                                                                           
retaliation claim using the Pickering test); Matthew Tokson, Blank Slates, 59 B.C. L. REV. 591, 624 
(2018) (describing factors considered by the Pickering test). 
 38 See Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22 (adding a new private citizen requirement to public employee 
free speech claims). 
 39 Id. The Court held that an employer’s interest in speech made pursuant to an employee’s job 
responsibilities is greater than the employer’s interest in that employee’s private speech. Id. at 423. 
The employer’s managerial duties may demand that they control speech made as part of the employ-
ee’s official duties. Id. 
 40 Id. at 425–26; see Steven J. Stafstrom, Jr., Note, Government Employee, Are You a “Citizen?”: 
Garcetti v. Ceballos and the “Citizenship” Prong to the Pickering/Connick Protected Speech Test, 52 
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 589, 607–08 (2008) (defining speaking “as a citizen” as speech not made as part of 
an employee’s official duties). It is a difficult task to draw the line between speech made as a private 
citizen and speech made in one’s official capacity. See Jessica Reed, From Pickering to Ceballos: The 
Demise of the Public Employee Free Speech Doctrine, 11 N.Y.C. L. REV. 95, 124 (2007) (noting the 
difficulty in determining when a public employee at work is acting as a private citizen versus in their 
official capacity); see, e.g., King v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs., 916 F.3d 1339, 1346 (11th Cir. 2019) 
(holding that a public employee’s statements about mishandling a medical clearance process were 
made as an employee and thus were not entitled to First Amendment protection); Lyman v. NYS 
OASAS, 928 F. Supp. 2d 509, 526 (N.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that a plaintiff’s advocacy for victims of 
a church sex abuse scandal was speech made as a private citizen and that it was entitled to First 
Amendment protection). 
 41 See, e.g., Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22 (establishing a private citizen requirement for public 
employee free speech claims); Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 (establishing a public concern requirement 
for public employee free speech claims); Palardy, 906 F.3d at 81 (discussing application of public 
concern and private citizen requirements). 
 42 See Sanguigni v. Pittsburgh Bd. of Pub. Educ., 968 F.2d 393, 400 (3d Cir. 1992) (noting the 
split in circuits on application of Connick analysis to free association claims). Free association rights 
mean the right to participate in organized activity with fellow employees. See id. at 400 (describing 
free association rights as the right to organize fellow faculty against administration policies). In San-
guigni v. Pittsburgh Board of Public Education in 1992, a teacher complained that her principal har-
assed her and rated her poorly after she helped create a newsletter that called attention to harassment 
issues within the school. Id. at 395–96. She claimed that this retaliation violated her rights to free 
speech and free association. Id. at 396. In cases like Sanguigni and Palardy, a claim based on the right 
to free association refers to a petitioner’s attempt to associate or organize with peers. Palardy, 906 
F.3d at 81. In a free speech claim, typically an employer retaliated against an employee for a specific 
instance of speech. Sanguigni, 968 F.2d at 400. 
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concern requirement to free association claims by public employees.43 Mean-
while, the Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have held that these claims have no pub-
lic concern requirement.44 The Ninth and Tenth Circuits each take mixed ap-
proaches.45 At the time Palardy was first heard, the Third Circuit had not yet 
taken a position either way.46 
B. The Background and Procedural Posture of Palardy 
Palardy arose out of a disciplinary dispute between a Township of Mill-
burn, New Jersey police officer and the town’s business administrator.47 Plain-
tiff Michael Palardy was a police officer for Millburn from 1988 to 2014.48 He 
was also an active member of two police officers’ unions, the Patrolmen’s Be-
nevolent Association (PBA) and the Superior Officers’ Association (SOA).49 
He served as PBA sergeant-at-arms in 1991, union delegate from 1992–1995,50 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See, e.g., Cobb, 363 F.3d at 107 (holding that a public employee attempting to claim that their 
free association rights were violated must establish that the associational activity relates to a public 
concern); Edwards, 178 F.3d at 249 (analogizing limitations on a public employee’s free association 
rights to similar limitations on their free speech rights); Griffin, 929 F.2d at 1212–13 (maintaining the 
public concern requirement for both free speech and free association claims); Boals, 775 F.2d at 692 
(applying the Connick test to both free association and free speech claims). 
 44 Boddie v. City of Columbus, 989 F.2d 745, 749 (5th Cir. 1993); Hatcher, 809 F.2d at 1558. In 
Boddie, a fireman sued the City of Columbus for firing him because of his association with union 
members. 989 F.2d at 747. The Fifth Circuit held that public employee freedom of association claims 
related to union activity did not need to meet the Connick public concern test. Id. at 749. In Hatcher, a 
teacher sued her school district, alleging that she was denied a promotion due to her association with 
parents who protested a school closing. 809 F.2d at 1557. The Eleventh Circuit held that Connick’s 
public concern requirements were inapplicable to free association claims. Id. at 1558. 
 45 See Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691, 698 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that free speech and free 
association rights are so similar that a case implicating both can be treated like a case implicating only 
free speech rights). The Ninth Circuit applies the public concern requirement in cases involving en-
twined free speech and free association claims. Palardy, 906 F.3d at 82. It has not decided how to 
approach free association claims with no speech component. Id. The Tenth Circuit generally applies 
the public concern requirement to free association cases, but does not apply it in the public-employee 
union context. See Shrum v. City of Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that, 
specifically when discussing labor union associations, the court will not impose a public concern re-
quirement to free association claims). But see Merrifield v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 654 F.3d 1073, 1083 
(10th Cir. 2011) (applying public concern requirement to free association claim arising out of public 
employee’s retaining of an attorney). 
 46 Palardy, 906 F.3d at 82. 
 47 Id. at 78–80. 
 48 Id. at 79. Palardy first served as a patrolman. Id. He was promoted to Sergeant in 1995, Lieuten-
ant in 1998, and, in 2012, he became Captain. 
 49 Id. The Patrolmen’s Benevolent Association (PBA) is a labor union that represents patrol offic-
ers, and the Superior Officers’ Association (SOA) represents officers of lieutenant rank. See About 
NJSOA, N.J. SUPERIOR OFFICERS’ ASS’N, http://www.njsoa.org/about_welcome.html [https://perma.
cc/AXD7-9TAQ]. The hierarchy of police ranks in Millburn goes from patrol officer, to lieutenant, to 
captain, and finally to chief. Palardy, 906 F.3d at 79. 
 50 Palardy, 906 F.3d at 79. It is unclear from the opinion and filings for which union he served as 
delegate. Id. 
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SOA vice president in 2007 or 2008, and SOA president in 2009 or 2010.51 
Defendant Timothy Gordon was the business administrator for Millburn during 
the same time period.52 This position gave him the authority to hire, fire, and 
promote police officers.53 
In late 2010, Millburn had no chief of police, and Palardy hoped to as-
sume that position.54 At that point, Palardy had the most seniority among Mill-
burn’s lieutenants and thus expected to be promoted to captain and then 
chief.55 Nevertheless, Gordon told Palardy that he wanted to bring in a chief 
from Livingston, New Jersey because he believed that none of the currently 
active lieutenants were ready to become chief.56 Before Gordon could recruit a 
captain from another town, a Millburn captain returned from inactive duty and 
Gordon appointed this captain chief.57 Meanwhile, Gordon promoted Palardy 
to “acting captain.”58 Palardy felt that Gordon disapproved of his union activi-
ty and this disapproval had harmed his chances at a promotion to chief or full 
captain.59 As a result, Palardy resigned as union president because he believed 
that doing so would increase his chances of a full promotion.60 
Despite Palardy’s attempt to earn a promotion to chief, he realized that no 
promotion would be forthcoming no matter how long he waited.61 In October 
2011, a consultant recommended that Millburn fill all open positions in the 
captain rank.62 In 2012, Gordon promoted Palardy to captain.63 In 2013, the 
Township’s Board of Education offered Palardy a Security Coordinator posi-
                                                                                                                           
 51 Id. The record does not clearly establish the precise dates for some of these positions; approxi-
mations are given in the original opinion. Id. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. 
 55 Id. Typically, during Palardy’s tenure, the Township selected its chief of police from among its 
captains, who had previously been promoted from lieutenant. Id. Palardy noted that he could not have 
been promoted directly from lieutenant to chief pursuant to this policy. Id. He could, however, have 
been promoted to captain, then rapidly to chief, as he was the most senior lieutenant at this time. Id. 
 56 Id. at 79–80. The Livingston Chief of Police would have then become chief of police for both 
towns simultaneously. Id. at 80. 
 57 Id. at 80. 
 58 Id. This position came with an increase in responsibilities but no increase in pay. Id. 
 59 See id. (reporting that Gordon told another officer that Palardy would never become chief “be-
cause of his union affiliation and being a thorn in my side for all these years”). Gordon allegedly stat-
ed that Palardy’s close relationship with the officers under his command made him a bad supervisor, 
and he had to learn to separate his work for the union from his work as a police officer. Id. 
 60 Id. Palardy believed that resigning from union president would alter Gordon’s perception that 
his involvement with the union would impede his success in a leadership role. Id. 
 61 Id. 
 62 Id. 
 63 Id. Palardy believed that this was “out of desperation” by Gordon. Id. It is unclear what might 
have caused this desperation, aside from a lack of suitable candidates for captain. See id. (summarizing 
Palardy’s argument that his promotion was an act of desperation, but not providing any potential cause). 
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tion.64 Effective February, 1, 2014, Palardy retired from the police force.65 
Subsequently he accepted the Board of Education’s offer.66 
After his retirement, Palardy filed a suit against Millburn and Gordon in the 
Superior Court of New Jersey.67 His amended complaint asserted, inter alia, re-
taliation for exercise of free speech and free association rights and violation of 
free speech rights.68 Defendants filed for removal to federal district court, which 
the District Court for the District of New Jersey granted in March 2015.69 
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss all of the charges, and the N.J. 
District Court granted the motion with respect to several of the charges, leav-
ing only the constitutional free speech and free association claims.70 These 
claims asserted that Gordon violated Palardy’s free speech and free association 
rights by retaliating against Palardy for his union organizing activity.71 After 
discovery, the defendants moved for and were granted summary judgment on 
the outstanding claims.72 The district court found that Palardy had not spoken 
on a matter of public concern, nor had he spoken as a private citizen.73 The 
court therefore held that he had failed to meet the requirements of Garcetti.74 
Palardy appealed the grant of summary judgment to the Third Circuit.75 
                                                                                                                           
 64 Id. At this point, Palardy recognized that he would not become chief, claiming that he “saw the 
writing on the wall,” but the court did not elaborate beyond that in its opinion. Id. 
 65 Id. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Notice of Removal at 1, Palardy v. Twp. of Millburn, 2017 WL 2968394 (D.N.J. July 11, 
2017). 
 68 Second Amended Complaint at 5–11, Palardy, 2017 WL 2968394 (2:15-cv-02089-SDW-
SCM). Palardy asserted that Gordon’s refusal to promote him was retaliation for Palardy’s union or-
ganizing speech and activity. Id. at 5. 
 69 Notice of Removal, supra note 67, at 1. 
 70 Palardy, 906 F.3d at 80. 
 71 Palardy v. Twp. of Millburn, No. 2:15-cv-02089-SDW-SCM, 2017 WL 2968394, at *2–3 
(D.N.J. July 11, 2017). Palardy alleged that Gordon retaliated against him by commissioning a pair of 
studies meant to prevent Palardy from attaining the rank of captain, denying him a retroactive wage 
increase, considering other candidates for the position of Chief of the Millburn Police department, and 
declining to promote him to the chief position. Id. 
 72 Palardy, 906 F.3d at 80. Courts grant summary judgment for one party when there is no disa-
greement by the parties on any fact material to the outcome of the case and the moving party is “enti-
tled to judgment as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48 (1986). 
 73 Palardy, 906 F.3d at 80; see Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421–22 (holding that the First Amendment 
does not protect employee speech made as part of that employee’s job responsibilities). 
 74 Palardy, 2017 WL 2968394, at *5–6. The district court did not apply a separate analysis to 
Palardy’s free speech and free association claims. Palardy, 906 F.3d at 81. Instead, the district court 
analyzed Palardy’s First Amendment claim as a whole and applied the Garcetti test to that claim. Id. 
at 80; see Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 420 (holding that First Amendment protections apply only to speech 
by “citizens on matters of public concern”). 
 75 Palardy, 906 F.3d at 77. 
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II. THE CIRCUIT COURTS’ VARYING APPROACHES TO APPLYING  
THE PUBLIC CONCERN AND PRIVATE CITIZEN TESTS  
TO FREE ASSOCIATION CLAIMS 
Prior to 2018, the Third Circuit had not ruled on whether the requirements 
of Garcetti v. Ceballos and Connick v. Myers apply to public employee free 
association claims, and the circuit courts are divided on this issue.76 Section A 
of this Part describes how the other circuit courts apply Garcetti and Connick 
to public employee free association claims.77 Section B of this Part describes 
the approach taken by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in 2018 in Palardy v. 
Township of Millburn.78 
A. How the Other Circuit Courts Apply the Public Concern  
and Private Citizen Tests to Free Association Claims 
After Pickering v. Board of Education established the balancing test for 
public employee free speech claims and Connick added the public concern 
prong to that test, the circuits began to diverge on whether the Connick re-
quirement applied equally to free association claims.79 
A majority of circuit courts applied the public concern requirement to free 
speech and free association claims equally.80 In 1985, in Boals v. Grey, the 
Sixth Circuit did not distinguish between free speech and free association 
claims.81 The court applied the public concern test to both.82 The Sixth Circuit 
read the Supreme Court’s free speech opinion in Pickering to be based on an 
                                                                                                                           
 76 Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421–22 (2006); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 
(1983); see Palardy v. Twp. of Millburn, 906 F.3d 76, 82 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting divide among Circuits 
on the application of Connick and Garcetti to free association claims). 
 77 See infra notes 79–97 and accompanying text. 
 78 See infra notes 98–107 and accompanying text. 
 79 See Connick, 461 U.S. at 147 (1983) (establishing public concern prong as part of the Pickering 
test); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (establishing a balancing test for public 
employee free speech claims); William A. Herbert, The First Amendment and Public Sector Labor 
Relations, 19 LAB. LAW. 325, 343–44 (2004) (noting the split in circuits regarding the suitability of 
the public concern requirement to free association claims). Compare Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 692 
(6th Cir. 1985) (holding that the Connick public concern test applies equally to speech and association 
claims), with Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1158 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that a public employee 
alleging dismissal for his political affiliation need not meet the public concern requirement governing 
free speech claims). 
 80 See, e.g., Cobb v. Pozzi, 363 F.3d 89, 104–05 (2d Cir. 2004) (applying the public concern re-
quirement to free association claims); Edwards v. City of Goldboro, 178 F.3d 231, 249 (4th Cir. 1999) 
(same); Griffin v. Thomas, 929 F.2d 1210, 1212–13 (7th Cir. 1991) (same); Boals, 775 F.2d at 692 
(same). 
 81 Boals, 775 F.2d at 692. 
 82 Id. 
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underlying free association theory.83 The Seventh Circuit followed Boals in 
1991 in Griffin v. Thomas, holding that there was no reason to treat speech and 
associational claims differently.84 The Seventh Circuit noted that Pickering 
dealt with a case involving both speech and associational rights, and, further, 
that the Supreme Court had historically cautioned against establishing a hierar-
chy among First Amendment rights.85 The Fourth Circuit also applied the pub-
lic concern test to a public employee’s free association claim in 1999, in Ed-
wards v. City of Goldboro, on the basis of the similarity between an employ-
ee’s First Amendment free association and free speech claims.86 Finally, in 
2004, in Cobb v. Pozzi, the Second Circuit held that free association claims 
should have to meet the public concern bar.87 After a lengthy canvas of exist-
ing jurisprudence on the application of the public concern bar to free associa-
tion claims, the Second Circuit decided that the test should apply, resting its 
decision on two pillars: first, that Connick should apply to all expressive activi-
ty by a public employee, not just speech.88 The Second Circuit was also con-
cerned that exempting free association claims from the public concern test 
would create a two-tiered system of first amendment rights.89 
Not all Circuit Courts have applied the public concern test to free associa-
tion claims.90 The Eleventh Circuit in 1987, in Hatcher v. Board of Public Ed-
ucation & Orphanage, declined to apply the public concern test to free asso-
ciation claims, arguing that to do so would undermine established jurispru-
dence and first amendment liberties.91 The Fifth Circuit followed suit in 1991 
                                                                                                                           
 83 Id. Because Pickering and Connick were based on underlying free association claims, the Sixth 
Circuit reasoned, the public concern requirements they established should be applied to free associa-
tion claims. Id. 
 84 929 F.2d at 1212–13. 
 85 Id. at 1213–14 (quoting McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485 (1985), to caution against estab-
lishing a tiered system of rights stating that “there is no sound basis for granting greater constitutional 
protection to statements made in a petition . . . than other First Amendment expressions”). 
 86 See Edwards, 178 F.3d at 249 (analogizing limitations on a public employee’s free association 
rights to similar limitations on their free speech rights). 
 87 363 F.3d at 104–05. 
 88 Id. at 102–03. The Second Circuit used the term “expressive activity” to refer to both speech 
and association and held that the requirements from Connick applied to all expressive activity. Id. at 
104. 
 89 See id. at 105 (holding that applying Connick to speech claims only would elevate free associa-
tion rights above free speech rights). 
 90 See, e.g., Coughlin, 946 F.2d at 1158 (declining to extend public concern requirement to public 
employee free association claims); Hatcher v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. & Orphanage, 809 F.2d 1546, 1558 
(11th Cir. 1987) (same). 
 91 See Hatcher, 809 F.2d at 1558 (noting that the public concern requirement, as applied to free 
association claims, would overturn precedent and damage first amendment rights). The court held that 
Connick did not overturn NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958), which sub-
jected any state action limiting free association rights to the “closest scrutiny.” Id. 
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in Coughlin v. Lee, holding that a public employee’s claim that his right to 
freely associate had been violated was not subject to the public concern bar.92 
Two circuits have taken hybrid approaches.93 The Ninth Circuit has not yet 
decided a case where the plaintiff’s free association claim predominates over an 
intertwined free speech claim.94 In 2005 in Hudson v. Craven, the Ninth Circuit 
held that when a claim alleges intertwined violations of free speech and free as-
sociation rights (what the court calls a “hybrid” claim), the Connick public con-
cern requirement should apply.95 Meanwhile, the Tenth Circuit in 2006 in Shrum 
v. City of Coweta declined to apply the public concern requirement to free asso-
ciation claims based on a public employee’s association with a union.96 Until it 
decided Palardy, the Third Circuit had not taken a position on whether the public 
concern requirement applied to free association claims.97 
B. The Third Circuit’s Approach 
In 2018 in Palardy, the Third Circuit stated that it would follow the Fifth 
Circuit’s approach.98 The court’s opinion, however, made it clear that its deci-
sion turned on the unique circumstances of an association claim arising from 
union-related activity.99 The court held that, inevitably, some union speech and 
                                                                                                                           
 92 See Coughlin, 946 F.2d at 1158 (holding that a public employee alleging dismissal for his polit-
ical affiliation need not meet the public concern requirement governing free speech claims). Although 
the ruling in Coughlin dealt specifically with free association for political affiliation, the Fifth Circuit 
later clarified in Boddie v. City of Columbus that it would not apply the public concern test to any 
public employee free association claims. 989 F.2d 745, 749 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing Prof’l Ass’n of 
Coll. Educators v. El Paso Cty. Comm. Coll. Dist., 730 F.2d 258, 262 (5th Cir. 1984) (holding that 
state action to prevent employees from associating with a union violates the First Amendment)). 
 93 See Shrum v. City of Coweta, 449 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2006) (holding that, when dis-
cussing labor union associations, the court will not impose a public concern requirement to free asso-
ciation claims); Hudson v. Craven, 403 F.3d 691, 698 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that free speech and 
free association rights are so similar that a case implicating both can be treated similarly to a case 
implicating only free speech rights). 
 94 See Hudson, 403 F.3d at 696 (noting that the court has not yet addressed a primarily free-
association-based claim). In an intertwined claim, the plaintiff claims that their free speech and free 
association rights have both been violated in the same set of facts. Id. 
 95 See id. at 698 (holding that when association involves a single event with a specific speech 
component, applying the Connick test is appropriate). 
 96 Shrum, 449 F.3d at 1138. The Tenth Circuit noted that the Pickering test allowed a government 
to weigh its interest as an employer in controlling its employees’ speech to provide efficient public 
service. Id. at 1139. Where, however, the state has signed a collective bargaining agreement with a 
union, it has acknowledged the union’s right to represent its workers. Id. Therefore, in the specific 
realm of public employee union association, the public concern test is not appropriate. Id. 
 97 Palardy, 906 F.3d at 82. 
 98 Id. 
 99 See id. (noting that even courts that still apply the public concern requirement to free associa-
tion claims have recognized that union association sometimes is a public concern). The court noted 
that union membership is binary, whereby a given petitioner is either a union member or not, and 
unions often speak on a diverse set of concerns. Id. at 83. The court also held that determining which 
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activity would satisfy the public concern bar.100 Because there was no basis for 
determining when that standard was met, the court held that applying the pub-
lic concern bar to union-based free association claims would be inappropri-
ate.101 The Fifth Circuit noted that even courts that applied the public concern 
test to associational claims acknowledged that some union-related activity 
would meet the requirements of that test.102 By analogy, then, some union 
membership might by itself be of public concern.103 The Third Circuit fol-
lowed the Fifth Circuit’s approach in Boddie v. City of Columbus, stating that 
free association claims based on union membership need not meet the public 
concern requirement.104 The court thereby sidestepped the problem of classify-
ing any individual union membership as public concern related or not.105 This 
ruling, in effect, creates a carve-out rule for unions.106 Public employees in the 
Third Circuit do not have to meet the public concern and private citizen re-
quirements for their free association claims—as long as those claims are based 
on the employee’s union activity.107 
III. THE THIRD CIRCUIT’S HOLDING IS NARROWER THAN IT  
SEEMS, AND A PER SE RULE WOULD WORK BETTER TO  
PROTECT PUBLIC EMPLOYEES’ RIGHTS 
The Third Circuit’s decision in Palardy v. Township of Millburn repre-
sented a step towards uniformity in public employee free association claims, 
but the rule it created is far from straightforward.108 This Part analyzes the 
Third Circuit’s decision and argues that the holding does not clearly establish 
its scope and does not go far enough to protect public employee associational 
rights.109 It then evaluates one possible alternate approach to public employee 
free speech association claims.110 Section A argues that the Third Circuit mis-
characterizes the scope of its holding, and it resembles the Tenth Circuit’s ap-
                                                                                                                           
union memberships reflected a public concern and thus deserved First Amendment protection was not 
a readily justiciable question due to the absence of applicable standards. Id. 
 100 Id. at 82–83. 
 101 See id. (noting the lack of standards for differentiating between public employee union mem-
bership that meets the public concern requirement). 
 102 Id. at 82. 
 103 Id. 
 104 See id. at 83 (noting the difficulty of classifying union memberships as “public concern” relat-
ed and holding that use of a per se rule declaring that they are avoids this problem). 
 105 Id. 
 106 Id. at 84. 
 107 Id. 
 108 See Palardy v. Twp. of Millburn, 906 F.3d 76, 82–83 (3d Cir. 2018) (claiming to follow the 
Fifth Circuit’s approach to public employee free association claims, but characterizing that approach 
in two different ways). 
 109 See infra notes 113–134 and accompanying text. 
 110 See infra notes 135–155 and accompanying text. 
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proach more than the Fifth’s.111 Section B suggests an alternative approach 
that preserves worker rights without creating an unworkably specific rule.112 
A. The Third Circuit’s Ruling Resembles the Hybrid Approach 
 of the Tenth Circuit More Than the “No Public Concern  
Requirement” Approach of the Fifth Circuit 
The Third Circuit claimed to adopt the Fifth Circuit’s position.113 The 
court, however, framed that position in two different ways over the course of 
its opinion.114 Relying on the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Boddie v. City. of Co-
lumbus, the Third Circuit clarified that its holding was limited to the labor or-
ganization context as well.115 The Third Circuit’s reasoning largely focused on 
the unique characteristics of union organizing activity, and the opinion took a 
position only on associational claims in a union context.116 It is also unclear 
whether union-related speech claims still have to meet the public concern re-
quirement in the Third Circuit.117 
When discussing the application of Garcetti v. Ceballos’s private-citizen 
requirement, the court held that it was inapplicable to union-activity-based 
claims.118 The Third Circuit held that public employee union affiliation could 
not be considered one of an employee’s job responsibilities, precluding the 
application of Garcetti.119 
                                                                                                                           
 111 See infra notes 113–134 and accompanying text. 
 112 See infra notes 135–155 and accompanying text. 
 113 Palardy, 906 F.3d at 82 (citing Boddie v. City of Columbus, 989 F.2d 745, 749 (5th Cir. 
1993)). 
 114 Id. The Third Circuit claims that the Fifth Circuit has taken the view that the public concern 
requirement does not apply to claims based on freedom of association. Id. This is true, but the holding 
in Boddie states only that public concern need not be independently proven in the context of a claim 
stemming from union organization. See Boddie, 989 F.2d at 749 (holding that a freedom of associa-
tion claim based on union association does not need to separately prove public concern); see also 
Coughlin v. Lee, 946 F.2d 1152, 1158 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that a public employee alleging dis-
missal for his political affiliation need not meet the public concern requirement governing free speech 
claims). 
 115 Palardy, 906 F.3d at 82. 
 116 See id. at 82–83 (choosing to follow the Fifth Circuit in the “specific context” of public em-
ployee union associational claims). 
 117 See id. at 84 (dismissing Palardy’s speech claim because it did not allege any conduct beyond 
that alleged in the association claim and was therefore duplicative). The Court held that membership 
in a union is always a matter of public concern, but did not elaborate on how this principle might 
affect union-related speech. Id. at 83. 
 118 Id. at 83–84; see Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 421–22 (2006) (explaining that, for an 
instance of public employee speech to be constitutionally protected, it must be made outside of the 
employee’s official duties). 
 119 Palardy, 906 F.3d at 83–84; see Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (holding that statements made pur-
suant to an employee’s official duties are not protected under the First Amendment). The Third Circuit 
noted in its analysis the impact of the Supreme Court’s 2018 decision Janus v. American Federation 
of State, County, & Municipal Employees, Council 31, which exempted public employees from paying 
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Nevertheless, the breadth of the Third Circuit’s ruling is unclear.120 The 
court explicitly stated that it would not apply Garcetti’s private-citizen re-
quirements to free association claims based on membership in a union.121 In 
the next sentence, however, the court stated that the opinion in Garcetti made it 
clear that the private citizen requirement applied only to speech, not to associa-
tional claims.122 Therefore, following Palardy, it is unclear whether courts in 
the Third Circuit should (1) not apply Garcetti’s private citizen requirement to 
any associational claims at all, or (2) simply hold that union associational ac-
tivity is exempt from that rule.123 
Thus, the position taken by the Third Circuit resembles more the hybrid 
approach of the Tenth Circuit than that of the Fifth.124 It places the locus of its 
analysis on whether the underlying claim relates to union activity rather than 
constructing a broad rule applicable to all associational claims.125 Although the 
court allowed Palardy’s claim to proceed, the precedential effect of the Third 
Circuit’s opinion will differ depending on how courts interpret this ruling.126 
                                                                                                                           
agency fees even when they benefited from union representation. Janus v. Am. Fed’n of State, Cnty., 
& Mun. Emps, Council 31, 138 S. Ct. 2448, 2474 (2018); Palardy, 906 F.3d at 83–84. Janus thus 
undermined the idea that union membership might be a job responsibility of a public employee. 
Palardy, 906 F.3d at 83–84; see Janus, 138 S. Ct. at 2460 (holding that nonunion public employees 
cannot be compelled to subsidize the union’s bargaining efforts). 
 120 See Palardy, 906 F.3d at 83 (declining to apply private citizen requirement to public employee 
free association claim). The Third Circuit stated that, by the “plain language” of the Garcetti opinion, 
the private citizen requirement applies only to speech. Id. But in the next paragraph, the Third Circuit 
held that union membership could never be considered one of a public employee’s “official duties,” 
and therefore a claim based on union membership would never fail the private citizen test. Id. at 83–
84. It is unclear from the text of the opinion whether the court intended to hold that the private citizen 
test is categorically inapplicable to free association claims, or whether the unique traits of union asso-
ciation make that test inapplicable. See id. (holding that private citizen requirement applies only to 
speech claims and declining to apply the private citizen requirement to association claims, but failing 
to provide additional clarity on the rule). 
 121 Palardy, 906 F.3d at 83. 
 122 Id.; see Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 421 (holding that statements made pursuant to an employee’s 
official duties are not protected under the First Amendment). 
 123 See Palardy, 906 F.3d at 83–84 (declining to apply Garcetti’s private citizen requirement to a 
union association claim). The Third Circuit based its holding both on the fact that union activity is 
separate from an employee’s normal job responsibilities and on the inapplicability of the private citi-
zen test to associational activity in general. Id. 
 124 Compare Palardy, 906 F.3d at 82 (restricting the holding to claims based on union affiliation), 
and Merrifield v. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 654 F.3d 1073, 1084 (10th Cir. 2011) (rejecting the public-
concern requirement in the “specific context” of public employee union association claims), with 
Coughlin, 946 F.2d at 1158 (holding that a public employee’s free association claim need not pass the 
public concern test regardless of the claim’s underlying facts). 
 125 Palardy, 906 F.3d at 82. 
 126 Compare Sinfuego v. Curry Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 360 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1246 (D.N.M. 
2018) (applying the public concern test to a public employee’s free association claim based on union 
organizing activity where there was no collective-bargaining agreement in place), with Blangsted v. 
Snowmass-Wildcat Fire Prot. Dist., No. 04–cv–02260–WDM–KLM, 2008 WL 4411440, at *4 (D. 
Colo. Sept. 16, 2008) (declining to apply the public concern test in the case of a public employee’s 
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Some district courts may apply the Fifth Circuit’s rule from Coughlin v. Lee, 
exempting all associational claims from the public concern requirement.127 
Others may follow the Tenth Circuit’s rule from Merrifield v. Board of County 
Commissioners, and exempt only associational claims that arise from union 
activity.128 The Third Circuit’s ruling meant to simplify public employee free 
association claims by removing the public concern requirement.129 Paradoxi-
cally, though, the ruling in Palardy may end up complicating those claims and 
leading to a profusion of contradictory outcomes.130 Furthermore, rules waiv-
ing the public concern requirement have been proposed for other types of pub-
lic employee speech.131 Excessive use of such rules threatens to honeycomb 
the public concern doctrine with exceptions, adding significant complication to 
ongoing litigation.132 The Court in Connick v. Meyers used the public concern 
                                                                                                                           
union organizing activity). Sinfuego and Blangsted were both decided in district courts in the Tenth 
Circuit after Shrum v. City of Coweta, where the Tenth Circuit held that the public concern test could 
not be applied to public employee free association claims based on union activity. Sinfuego, 360 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1246; Blangsted, 2008 WL 4411440 at *4; see also Shrum v. City of Coweta, 449 F.3d 
1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2006). These two courts came down on opposite sides on the question of 
whether the public concern requirement applied to all claims based on public employee union activity. 
Sinfuego, 360 F. Supp. 2d at 1246; Blangsted, 2008 WL 4411440, at *4. The disparity between these 
opinions, on two cases with very similar facts, demonstrates how such a carefully cabined holding can 
lead to unpredictable outcomes. See Sinfuego, 360 F. Supp. 3d at 1246 (choosing to apply the public 
concern test in a public employee union association case when the union does not have a collective 
bargaining agreement in place with its employer); Blangsted, 2008 WL 4411440, at *4 (declining to 
apply the public concern test on similar facts to Sinfuego); see also Shrum, 449 F.3d at 1138 (holding 
that the public concern test is not necessary for an associational claim arising from public employee 
union activity). 
 127 See Coughlin, 946 F.2d at 1158 (declining to apply the public concern requirement to public 
employee free association claims).  
 128 See Merrifield, 654 F.3d at 1083 (exempting only union-based associational claims from the 
public concern requirement). 
 129 See Palardy, 906 F.3d at 83 (noting that the court’s approach avoids the difficult analysis of 
whether a union membership is a matter of public concern). 
 130 See id. (explaining that the court’s approach avoids the application to associational claims of a 
test focused on the “content, form and context” of speech) (quoting Balton v. City of Milwaukee, 133 
F.3d 1036, 1041 (7th Cir. 1998) (Cudahy, J., concurring)). The Third Circuit referred to the Picker-
ing/Connick test as “cumbersome” when applied to associational claims, suggesting that one reason 
for the court’s approach was to simplify the process of evaluating union-based free association claims. 
Id.; Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 141 (1983); Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 
(1968). As noted above, however, even a carefully written exception may lead to unpredictable out-
comes. See supra note 126 and accompanying text (describing contradictory outcomes following 
precedent of the Tenth Circuit’s hybrid rule). 
 131 See Rosalie B. Levinson, Silencing Government Employee Whistleblowers in the Name of 
“Efficiency,” 23 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 17, 63–65 (1996) (suggesting the use of a rule waiving public 
concern requirement for public employee claims arising from whistleblowing speech, where a public 
employee raises the alert about an unlawful practice of his or her employer). 
 132 See Edward B. Marks Music Corp. v. Colo. Magnetics, Inc., 497 F.2d 285, 288 (10th Cir. 
1974) (holding that exceptions should be narrowly construed to avoid undermining the policy embod-
ied by a rule). 
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requirement to avoid constitutionalizing employee grievances.133 Adding too 
many exceptions to this requirement might allow through claims of the sort 
Connick hoped to prevent.134 
B. A Strict Scrutiny Approach Avoids the Problems  
Inherent in the Third Circuit’s Rule 
There is another way for courts to determine which public employee free 
association claims to allow without needing any narrow or easily misinterpret-
ed rules.135 The Third Circuit articulated one advantage to a rule declaring that 
union activity would always meet the public concern and private citizen re-
quirement: it would avoid the difficulty of implementing the Connick and Gar-
cetti tests in cases where they do not cleanly apply.136 Some scholars argue for 
the application of strict scrutiny to pure association claims without any speech 
component, rather than the public concern and private citizen tests and the 
Pickering balancing approach.137 Such an approach would follow the standard 
the Supreme Court set in 1984 in Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, where the Court held 
that a restriction on freedom of association, in order to be held constitutional, 
had to serve a compelling state interest that could not be achievable through 
less restrictive means.138 This language has traditionally been used by the 
Court to define “strict scrutiny,” the most exacting level of scrutiny that it will 
apply to evaluate whether a law is constitutional.139 
                                                                                                                           
 133 Connick, 461 U.S. 154. 
 134 See id. (declining to create a generally applicable rule to judge whether public employee 
statements touched a matter of public concern). 
 135 See Nicole M. Rementer, An Imbalanced Public Concern: The Case for Strict Scrutiny of Pure 
Freedom of Association Claims in Public Employment, 19 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 179, 205–09 
(2010) (arguing for strict scrutiny of all pure association claims by public employees). 
 136 See Palardy, 906 F.3d at 83 (noting the difficulty in finding a justiciable rule that can separate 
which union activity constitutes a public concern and the difficulty in applying the private citizen 
requirement to pure association claims with no speech component); see also Garcetti, 547 U.S. at 
421–22 (establishing the private citizen test for public employee free speech claims); Connick, 461 
U.S. at 147 (establishing the public concern test for public employee free speech claims). 
 137 Rementer, supra note 135, at 201–05. One scholar argues that the rule determining whether to 
apply the public concern test, rather than the nature of the association under consideration, should be 
whether the claim under consideration is a pure association claim without a speech component. Id. at 
202–04. If there is no speech component, then the public concern test should not apply. Id. at 205. The 
test could still be applied in some hybrid claims, mixing association and speech, which occur when an 
association claim contains an “essential speech component” and there is a “nexus” between that 
speech and the petitioner’s employment at issue. Id.; see, e.g., Melzer v. Bd. of Educ., 336 F.3d 185, 
194 (2d Cir. 2003) (describing a hybrid claim where the claimant was a teacher fired for organizing 
with the North American Man-Boy Love Association to change the age of consent laws). In Melzer, 
the court held that the petitioner’s claim arose from an act of association “of which speech was an 
essential component.” 336 F.3d at 194. 
 138 Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 623 (1984). 
 139 See Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505 (2005) (defining a strict scrutiny standard as 
requiring “narrowly tailored measures that further compelling governmental interests”). The Court in 
Roberts used similar language as in Johnson, referencing a “compelling state interest” and requiring 
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In the past, the Supreme Court has applied strict scrutiny to some public 
employee free association claims, bypassing the test from Pickering v. Board 
of Education altogether.140 This test has often been applied to patronage firing 
cases, where supporters of an outgoing administration are fired by a new ad-
ministration when it moves in.141 In cases since Pickering, however, the public 
concern test has predominated over the strict scrutiny standard for public em-
ployee free association claims, even as the strict scrutiny standard survives for 
free association claims outside the public employee context.142 
The strict scrutiny approach would protect public employees while pre-
serving their employer’s ability to discipline them for disruptive conduct.143 
Public employees’ non-speech conduct can and often does take place outside 
of work.144 Such out-of-work conduct does not usually disrupt the workplace, 
and courts should require the employer to prove that a “compelling state inter-
est” requires the public employee’s free association rights to be curtailed.145 
                                                                                                                           
that that interest could not be achieved through “means significantly less restrictive.” Roberts, 468 
U.S. at 623; see Johnson, 543 U.S. at 505 (defining strict scrutiny through reference to “narrowly 
tailored measures” and “compelling governmental interests”). 
 140 Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 574 (1968); see Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 363 
(1976) (applying strict scrutiny language in holding that employees of sheriff’s office could not be 
discharged for their political affiliation). In 1976 in Elrod, decided after Pickering, the Supreme Court 
held that a requirement that public employees support a particular political party could not be constitu-
tional unless it both served a “vital” purpose and was the “least restrictive” means of serving that 
purpose. Elrod, 427 U.S. at 363. The Court also held that the policy would be unconstitutional unless 
the advantage to the policy was greater than the loss of rights—language much more reminiscent of 
strict scrutiny than the Pickering test. See id. at 363 (describing standard that political-affiliation-
based terminations must meet to be constitutional). Compare Pickering, 391 U.S. 563 at 568 (laying 
out the balancing test for establishing a violation of public employee free speech rights), with John-
son, 543 U.S. at 505 (describing narrow tailoring and compelling state interest requirements for a 
policy to survive strict scrutiny). 
 141 See Craig D. Singer, Comment, Conduct and Belief: Public Employees’ First Amendment 
Rights to Free Expression and Political Affiliation, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 897, 901–04 (1992) (describing 
the use of strict scrutiny to evaluate patronage dismissal claims for employees not involved in policy 
making). One scholar contrasts the “heightened scrutiny” analysis applied in Elrod with the traditional 
Pickering test, and concludes that the latter test is best applied in cases of “overt expression” such as 
traditional free speech cases. Id. at 923. On the other hand, the “heightened scrutiny” Elrod approach 
is more appropriate for cases of dismissal based on an employee’s beliefs and associations, even if 
they are “incidentally manifested.” See Elrod, 427 U.S. at 362 (applying strict scrutiny test to public 
employee free association claims); Singer, supra, at 20 (describing the applicability of the Elrod test 
to varying fact patterns). 
 142 See Shahar v. Bowers, 114 F.3d 1097, 1102–03 (11th Cir. 1997) (declining to apply strict 
scrutiny to a public employee free association claim and instead applying the Pickering test). But see 
Salvation Army v. Dep’t of Comm. Affairs, 919 F.2d 183, 200 (3d Cir. 1990) (applying strict scrutiny 
to a religious charity’s free association claim). 
 143 See Rementer, supra note 135, at 205–09 (articulating the benefits of a strict scrutiny approach 
to public employee free association claims). 
 144 Id. at 202. 
 145 See id. at 205–06 (arguing that because these pure claims do not involve any actual speech by 
an employee there is less danger that third parties will impute the employee’s views to the employer; 
thus, the appropriate focus is not on the state’s role as employer, but on its role as government); see 
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The application of the strict scrutiny rule would also shift the burden of proof 
from employees to employers.146 Under this scheme, an employee would not 
have to demonstrate that their act of association implicated a public concern.147 
Instead, employers would have to demonstrate that their restriction of their 
employee’s rights served a compelling state interest.148 
Such a rule would create more uniformity than the union association 
carve-out proposed by the Third Circuit.149 It would remove any discretion by 
the court in determining whether the public concern bar should be applied in a 
specific case and, if so, whether the activity in question reaches that level.150 A 
strict scrutiny approach would still allow for reasonable regulation of an em-
ployee’s associations as long as this regulation is tailored to be the least restric-
tive means of accomplishing the desired end.151 
                                                                                                                           
also Katherine Trucco, Nothing to Gain, Nothing to Lose: How Heffernan v. City of Patterson, N.J., 
Creates Section 1983 Liability Absent a Deprived Right, 49 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 149, 160 (2017) (noting 
that association can derive from employee’s personal beliefs without an overt speech component). In 
cases with no speech component, the state’s power to control its employees’ behavior is far more 
limited, and it is appropriate to lay on the employer the task of demonstrating that a given regulation is 
acceptable. Rementer, supra note 135, at 205–06; see Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994) 
(holding that the government has more powers as an employer than it does as the state). 
 146 Rementer, supra note 135, at 206. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
 149 See Sinfuego, 360 F. Supp. 3d at 1246 (applying the public concern test to a public employee 
free association claim arising from union activity despite the controlling precedent of Shrum). As the 
New Mexico District Court’s 2018 decision Sinfuego demonstrates, even seemingly minor factual 
differences can allow a lower court to circumvent circuit precedent in the absence of a strong, univer-
sally applicable rule. See id. (justifying application of the public concern test because there was no 
collective bargaining agreement in place). Tenth Circuit precedent required the district court to waive 
the public concern test for union-based association claims, but the district court did not do so and 
distinguished its case by noting that there was no collective bargaining agreement in place with the 
union. Id.; see Shrum, 449 F.3d at 1138. 
 150 See Sinfuego, 360 F. Supp. 3d at 1246 (declining to follow Tenth Circuit precedent in evaluat-
ing public employee free association claim). The court in Sinfuego was able to distinguish its case 
from the controlling precedent due to a minor factual difference—an option that would not be availa-
ble if the Tenth Circuit used a strict scrutiny approach. See id. (distinguishing from Shrum because of 
the lack of a collective bargaining agreement between the petitioner’s union and her employer). 
 151 See New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 76–77 (1928) (upholding a law that 
distinguished between labor unions and “benevolent orders” on the one hand and the Ku Klux Klan on 
the other). The Court accepted regulations that restricted some associations, such as those with the Ku 
Klux Klan, based on the Klan’s violent actions and attempts to harm racial and religious minorities. Id. 
One scholar notes that, under a strict scrutiny standard, a public employer could bar its employees from 
membership in criminal gangs, as long as the objective of preventing criminal activity by state employees 
could not be achieved by less restrictive means. Rementer, supra note 135, at 206 (citing Piscottano v. 
Murphy, 511 F.3d 247, 276–77 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that correctional officers could be terminated 
from employment due to their association with Outlaws Motorcycle Club, a criminal gang)). Although 
the Second Circuit, in Piscottano in 2007, applied the public concern test to a pure association claim, 
they could have reached the same result with a strict scrutiny test by holding that termination was neces-
sary to achieve the goal of stopping correctional officers from breaking the law. Id. 
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If this framework were in place prior to the resolution of Palardy, the Third 
Circuit’s task in evaluating Palardy’s free association claim would be much sim-
pler.152 Because his claim—that he was denied a promotion because of his close as-
sociation with his union—contains no speech component, the court would merely 
need to ask what interest the defendant was pursuing in firing him.153 Even if that 
interest was compelling, such as preventing disruption of the workplace, the court 
would have to consider whether there existed any narrower, less restrictive means of 
achieving that end.154 An answer in the affirmative would allow Palardy’s claim to 
prevail, although an answer in the negative would at least reassure him, and other 
potential litigants, that the defendant took the narrowest possible approach to solving 
a compelling workplace dilemma.155 
CONCLUSION 
Although the Third Circuit’s approach is an improvement over the public 
concern analysis applied by some circuits, it does not go far enough to create the 
desired uniformity of outcomes when analyzing public employee free association 
claims. The Third Circuit’s approach, a rule declaring that union membership is 
always a public concern, still requires the application of judicial discretion to de-
termine whether a novel case is sufficiently factually similar to the precedent for 
the rule to apply. The Third Circuit’s rule preserves the structure of the Pickering 
test, forcing courts to evaluate whether an association claim meets the public con-
cern requirement. This requirement, originally designed to evaluate employee 
speech, is ill-suited for evaluating associational claims. 
In association cases, where the risk of imputing an employee’s actions to their 
employer is reduced, forcing the employee to carry the burden of demonstrating that 
their association represents a public concern improperly shifts that burden from the 
government, who would carry it in most other First Amendment cases. A strict scru-
tiny approach in pure association cases moves this burden to where it should proper-
ly fall: on the employer. It ensures the protection of the right to freedom of associa-
tion, a right belonging to all American citizens—even public employees. 
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